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Abstract:
Although there is reason to expect that outsourcing plays an increasingly important role in
world of commerce, theories of firm boundaries poorly address associated processes of
governance change. This paper seeks to address this gap in the spirit of the evolutionary
theory of the firm. This approach highlights the significance of outsourcing as a “process of
shifting from internal to external procurement of activities.” Adopting an evolutionary
process perspective suggests limits to outsourcing due to governance inseparability and
partly tacit complementarity of capabilities as well as related dis-aggregation costs,
including the costs of knowledge codification in the specification of interfaces in
supplier/buyer relations, loss of absorptive capacity and integrating capabilities in the
supplier’s system. A key departure from earlier approaches to firm boundaries is an
explanation of such limits to outsourcing and their impact on two interrelated sources of
efficiency: incentives and capabilities. For instance, when limits to outsourcing obtain,
governance change for particular activities involves compromises of capability- and/or
incentive efficiency in the experimental determination of organizational boundaries. Also
discussed are environmental dynamics that variously emphasise efficiency properties of
dispersed or concentrated ownership and capability development.
11. Introduction
Firms are increasingly challenged to navigate in a ‘new competitive landscape’ (Bettis
& Hitt, 1995; Schendel, 1995) characterised by decreasing transaction costs due to
technological advance in communication technology (Coombs & Metcalfe, 2000), a
need to integrate increasingly diverse technology and knowledge domains per product
offering (Pavitt, 1999), and intensified competition due to deregulation and rapid
technological change and diffusion (Clark & Wheelwright, 1993; D'Aveni, 1994). At
a governance level, firms have responded to these challenges with an increasing
degree of corporate dis-aggregation accompanied by relational forms of outsourcing.1
Corporate dis-aggregation is the organizational response to knowledge based
competition: a need to compete based on focussed and integrative learning, accessing
external specialized knowledge, and developing relational advantages through inter-
firm cooperation (Day&Wendler, 1999; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Hamel & Prahalad,
1994; Zenger&Hesterly, 1997).
Zenger & Hesterly (1997) explain the trend to relational forms of outsourcing
by incentive advantages of smaller organizational units. As the size of a productive
unit decreases, incentive intensity increases because performance can be better
observed among smaller number of contributors, thus, linking performance to rewards
is eased. Also, free riding may be less severe in smaller units because of lower
monitoring costs. Empirical studies associated such work conditions with the
attraction of talent and innovation (Zenger, 1994; Kamien & Schwartz, 1982). Others
suggest that corporate dis-aggregation facilitates specialized learning and focus on
core-competences (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994). Incentives for learning and knowledge
sharing increase because the smaller productive units are, the fewer members have to
share positive outcomes. When interaction frequency increases (Demsetz, 1988) in a
smaller subset of relations between actors, cooperation is facilitated (Axelrod, 1984),
shared specialized codes, language (Arrow, 1974; Grant, 1996), and coordination
routines (Cohen & Bacadayan, 1994) emerge that facilitate knowledge combination
(Kogut & Zander, 1992).
On the other hand, increased outsourcing may establish a greater need for
accessing external knowledge in the form of contingent work (Matusik & Hill, 1998)
embedded in specialized supplies (Demsetz, 1988) or, else through inter-firm learning
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 Such relational form of outsourcing include long tern alliances, joint ventures, and other forms of
relational contracting (e.g. McNeil, 1985)
2(e.g. Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000; Lyles, & Stalk, 1999). Simultaneously, reduced activity
share and learning variety (March, 1991) as a consequence of outsourcing may
undermine a firm’s absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). Thus, reaping
specialisation gains through focused learning in a focal firm is limited by reduced
absorptive capacity that prevents tapping into external knowledge sources of
suppliers. Finally, outsourcing might also expose a firm to hold-up risks (Williamson,
1991). In sum then, corporate dis-aggregation, of which outsourcing is a special case
impacts a firm’s need and ability to access and embed specialised external knowledge,
focuses internal learning, and creates a need to rely on external knowledge. Although
the reasons and implications of outsourcing are increasingly understood, theories of
firm boundaries poorly address associated processes of governance change.
This paper seeks to address this gap in the spirit of the evolutionary theory of the
firm. Adopting an evolutionary perspective suggests limiting factors in managing
governance change, including governance inseparability (Argyres & Liebeskind,
1999), and partly tacit complementarity of capabilities. A key departure from earlier
approaches to firm boundaries is an explanation of such process limits to outsourcing
and their impact on two sources of efficiency: incentives and capabilities. When limits
to outsourcing impose dis-aggregation costs, governance change for particular
activities involves compromises of capability- and/or incentive efficiency in the
experimental determination of organizational boundaries. In this paper, I pursue an
evolutionary approach to the boundaries of the firm to address the following
questions:
• What is the impact of governance change on capability and incentive efficiency?
• How do limits to outsourcing affect the evolutionary process of governance
change?
• How do organizations experimentally respond to limits to outsourcing and dis-
aggregation costs?
While these questions fall under the traditional purview of organizational economics,
progress has been hampered by the lack of an adequate process perspective in the
theory of the firm (e.g. Mahoney, 1992; Foss & Foss, 2000). Ironically, despite the
central role processes and learning play in evolutionary economics, it treats the
experimental definition of firm boundaries not as a focal concern. By contrast, the
3property right literature and transaction cost economics have given some insight in the
determinants of (a) allocating ownership of residual usage rights to assets and (b)
make-or-buy decisions, and, by extension, the efficient boundaries of the firm.
However, because these models are not sensitive to the efficiency implication of
capability maintenance and development (Langlois & Foss, 1999), they only partially
explain the boundaries of firms by relative advantages of different institutional
(Williamson, 1985) or ownership structures (Hart, 1995). Moreover, these theories
assume that boundary definitions are discrete and reversible choices, and by
implication, governance change to increase and decrease the boundaries of the firm is
treated as theoretically equivalent. Not only do these theories side-step process issues
of governance change (e.g. Argyres & Libeskind, 1999; Foss, 1999), they also are ill
equipped to explain why processes that expand the scope of the firm differ
conceptually from those leading to corporate dis-aggregation. This is a central
concern of the current paper.
I build on the insights of the evolutionary approach to the theory of the firm to
clarify the process, and process determinants that can be expected to affect the
organization of economic activity. In particular, I will consider outsourcing as an
experimental process that seeks to improve incentives and capability efficiency by
shifting activities from internal to external procurement. This process approach is
particularly appropriate given the increasing importance of corporate dis-aggregation
in the economy. It reveals possible limits to the change of governance mechanisms.
In addition, by considering the joint role of incentives and capabilities in an
evolutionary process perspective (e.g. Dosi & Coriat, 1998; Dosi & Marengo, 2000),
it is possible to answer some outstanding questions regarding the processes of
governance change, limits to outsourcing such as dis-aggregation costs resulting in
governance compromise in the experimental determination of firm boundaries. For
instance, this approach facilitates the analysis of each of the three questions posed
above. This paper proceeds by outlining the basic assumptions behind an evolutionary
process perspective on governance change. Next I use this perspective to explicitly
treat outsourcing as an experimental process. This facilitates the investigation of
limits to outsourcing and dis-aggregation costs in relation to two sources of efficiency
in environments of varying dynamics. Finally, I summarize the conclusions of the
paper and compare and contrast it to related literature on the boundaries of the firm.
42. Evolutionary theory and governance change
Evolutionary theory (Dosi & Marengo 1994; Kogut and Zander 1992, 1996; Nelson
and Winter 1982; Nelson 1991; Marengo, 1999; Teece, Pisano & Schuen 1994; Teece
et al. 1994, Winter, 1988; 1982) provides the kernel of a process theory of economic
organization. A central question in evolutionary theory is why firm differences in
terms of characteristics, capabilities, and performance persists over time? Addressing
this question, evolutionary theorists (a) assume boundedly rational actors (Cyert &
March, 1963; Dosi & Egidi, 1991), (b) focus on problem solving procedures and
learning as the central unit of analysis (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and (c) emphasis
sensitivity to the contextual embededness and path dependency of organizational
behaviour (Dosi & Marengo, 1994) as three central elements of an evolutionary
explanations.
‘Bounded rationality’ means that human actors involved in complex problem
solving are limited in knowledge, skills and time. Thus, learning in organizations is
path-dependent (Dosi & Marengo, 1994) because prior learning constrains current and
future learning possibilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). Also, ‘bounded rationality’
implies a need for cognitive specialization. Routinized coordination in collective
problem solving is a response to this need (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Levinthal,
1993). Consequently, Nelson & Winter (1982, chapter 4 and 5) picture the firm as a
repository of unique routines. As Winter (1982) points out, “[t]he coordination
displayed in the performance of organizational routines is, like that displayed in
the exercise of individual skills, the fruit of practice...the learning experience is a
shared experience of organization members” (Winter, 1982:76). Routines,
essentially recurring and context dependent action patterns that sequence individual
actions into coherent organizational behaviour (Teece, et al, 1994), are selectable and
change through adaptive learning dynamics. Collectively they present a firm’s
capability (Selznick, 1957).
Because adaptation of routines is slow, they survive personal turnover (March
& Simon, 1958) and give stability to organizations and direction to their re-current
activities (Cyert & March, 1963).  Put differently: Current ways of organizing enable
firm’s to take advantage of sources of efficiency such as incentives and capabilities,
but they may also constrain governance change because a firm’s past, via partly tacit
5and path-dependent learning as well as prior contractual commitment, casts a shadow
on the future.
The core concern of evolutionary theory, however, is with “the dynamic
process by which firm behaviour patterns and market outcomes are jointly determined
over time” (Nelson & Winter, 1982: 18). Much has been learned about both ‘firm
behaviour patterns’ (the micro-evolutionary part) and ‘market outcomes’ (technolgical
change as the macro-evolutionary part), but the question how both are inter-related
remains to be addressed in greater detail. While the study of economic change and
changing firm behaviour is deemed important and interesting in its own right (Nelson
& Winter, 1982), governance change has not yet been addressed by evolutionary
theory. Likewise, recent contributions to the knowledge based theory of the firm
(Demsetz, 1988; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1993) fall
short in spelling out processes of governance change. But they have made governance
forms the starting point of such an investigation: A knowledge-based theory of the
firm is an important step in the understanding performance differences (Conner &
Prahalad, 1996).
Thus, this paper suggest that examining governance change might provide an
avenue to advance our understanding of how firm behaviour patterns and market
outcomes are jointly determined over time. In this context, Dosi & Coriat (1998)
recently stated a need to more clearly address the linkages between capabilities and
incentives as two co-evolving and complementary sources of differential efficiency.
In the authors word: “steps [need to be taken] towards an appreciation of the co-
evolution of (highly imperfect) mechanisms of governance, on the one hand, and
“what a firm is able to do and to discover” on the other” (p. 105). One step forward
in this direction is an investigation of governance change, and this paper addresses the
process of governance change in the context of outsourcing.
63. Outsourcing as an experimental process
Out of a vast and complex web of economic relations among agents, firms represent a
dis-aggregated subset of salient relations. These relations involve exchange as well as
non-exchange activities, they might be formal or informal, but the important point is
that the way such relations are dis-aggregated influences incentives of actors involved
to make investments in capabilities – the capacity to perform activities involved in
such relations. Thus, the experimental definition of firm boundaries is about
identifying and discovering possibilities to improve incentives, via the appropriation
of returns to investments in relationships among actors (Williamson, 1985, Hart,
1989) and to enhance, via learning in continued interaction, their capacity for
collective achievement (Nelson & Winter, 1982).
The evolutionary perspective on governance change defines “outsourcing as
an experimental process of shifting from internal to external procurement of
activities.” This definition has several implications. First, it requires that an activity
and associated learning investments have been previously performed in-house
(Coombs & Battiglia, 1998). Second, outsourced activities must remain in the
foreseeable future important in the value creation process of the focal firm (be it as
input for production, or as complement to product-market output). As a consequence,
divestitures and spin-offs that do not contribute to the focal firm’s value creation
process remain out of consideration.
Importantly, outsourcing in an evolutionary process perspective is
conceptually different from vertical integration (the main concern of transaction costs
theory and the property right approach) or diversification (a major concern of the
resource-based view). Both concern processes through which a firm expands the
scope of its activities. Teece et al (1994) argue in the context of diversification that
“the boundaries of the corporation can be understood in terms of learning, path
dependencies, technological opportunities, the selection environment, and the firm’s
position in complementary assets" (p. 11). If this argument is correct, then boundary-
decisions to expand the scope of the firm, once taken, might not be easily reversible
(as assumed in transaction cost, and property right theory) - they are conceptually
different from outsourcing. Also, outsourcing processes are consequential, because
they are often irreversible. Focussing competencies too narrowly can impede
possibilities to take advantage of external knowledge sources, because absorptive
7capacity is reduced (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). The effects of decreased absorptive
capacity include higher search costs to find specialised production partners as well as
impediments to access and utilise their knowledge (e.g. Aurora & Gambarella, 1994).
Finally, outsourcing processes are also experimental. They take place against
the backdrop of path-dependent and partly tacit capability development (Nelson &
Winter, 1982; Dosi & Marengo, 1994; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1998) and prior
governance choices (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1998). These can limit or slow down
outsourcing due to governance inseparability, and (partly tacit) complementarity of
capabilities. When such limits to outsourcing obtain and impose dis-aggregation costs,
governance change for particular activities involve compromises of capability- and/or
incentive efficiency in the experimental determination of organizational boundaries.
Optimal outcomes should not be expected. Complications such as bounded rationality,
path dependent capability development, interactions among multiple actors, and co-
evolution between incentives and capabilities imply that process limits might not be
obvious to actors involved and search efforts to overcome them are constrained by
existing capabilities and incentives (March, 1994). By implication, process outcomes
are likely to be sub-optimal, ‘governance compromises’ might be the rule rather than
the exception, and process steps might be best thought of as experimental discovery.
In the following I aim to further develop the evolutionary perspective on
governance change by addressing (1) the impact of governance change on two sources
of differential efficiency: capabilities and incentives; (2) limits to outsourcing and
their impact on governance change, and (3) governance compromise and their affect
on the inter-temporal distribution of learning among partners in outsourcing relations.
3.1 Governance change and sources of efficiency
Answers to the question about appropriate firm boundaries revolve around their
efficiency implications. Two main sources of efficiency are prevalent in the theory of
the firm boundaries: incentives (e.g. Williamson, 1985; Hart, 1989; 1995) and
capabilities (e.g. Nelson & Winter, 1982; Madhock, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992).
From an evolutionary perspective, both sources of efficiency serve as aspiration level
in the search for efficiency (March, 1994). Already, Smith (1776) has established the
basic argument that dis-aggregation of activities - along the dimensions of incentives
8(e.g. ownership and its substitutes) and coordinated specialised learning (e.g. the
division of labour) - influences efficiency in productive relations. 2
He noted concern over the separation of ownership and control by arguing that
the director of joint stock companies cannot be expected to be as vigilant watching
over others money as partners in private companies watch over their own. This
general exhibition of conflicting interest has found resonance in the contractual theory
of the firm concerned with complications of shirking, agency (Alchian & Demsetz,
1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1979), opportunism and asset specificity (Williamson,
1975; Klein, Alchian, & Crawford, 1978). This literature has identified ownership and
its substitutes (i.e. incentive schemes, monitoring) as sources of efficiency. In a world
where transaction costs are positive some opportunities for using resources are
difficult to know, costly to take into account if known, and, by implications, some of
such uses are non-transactable. In such a world, incentive alignment poses challenges
for parties involved in exchange relations, especially, when they are able and
equipped to make investments in productive relations (Williamson, 1985). When
skills and assets have to be brought to productive tasks, ownership of residual rights
(Hart, 1989), and its substitutes (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Ross, 1973; Jensen &
Meckling, 1979) are useful variable in a search process in which actors learn and
discover ways to align interests.
Smith (1976) also argued that the division of labour enhances skill
development, and by implication, influences the costs of knowledge production. A
greater division of labour increases productivity because the time spent on tasks is
usually more productive to specialized firms that concentrate on a narrow range of
capabilities. This general exhibition of the costs of learning and experimentation in
productive relations has found resonance in the knowledge-based theories of the firm
(Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Kogut & Zander, 1992). This
literature has identified capability maintenance and development as a source of
efficiency. In a world where costs of knowledge production including learning and
coordinating knowledge stocks are positive, new opportunities for using resources
(Schumpeter, 1952) are easier to discover, know and act on for some relative to
others. As Penrose (1959) notes: “…the productive opportunity of a firm must he
                                                          
2
 It is tiresome, however, to speculate what sources of efficiency is more important and the few
empirical studies that seek to test their relative merits (Popo & Zenger, 1998; Knott & McKelvey,
1999) yield opposite results while sample specificity prevents generalization.
9shown to be limited in any period. It is clear that this opportunity will be restricted to
the extent to which a firm does not see opportunities for expansion, is unwilling to act
upon them, or is unable to respond to them” (pp. 31-32). Where differences in the
distribution of productive knowledge are present, coordination of productive activities
poses challenges for parties involved in productive relations that cannot be reduced to
conflicting interest but, importantly involve perceptual differences of opportunities.
The underlying mechanism turns out to be the costs of learning and experimenting at
varying degrees of dis-aggregated relations.
Importantly, however there is increasing consensus (Winter, 1988; Foss, 1993;
Dosi & Coriat, 1998; Dosi & Marengo, 2000) that firms as institutions are neither
exclusively loci of problem solving, via capabilities or loci of conflict resolution via
incentive structures  – they are both. As Nelson & Winter (1982: 108) argue: “…some
sort of stable accommodation between the requirements of organizational functioning
and the motivation of … organizational members is a necessary concomitants of
routine operation.” Thus, the two sources of efficiency – incentives and capabilities –
are interrelated. For example, the effectiveness of incentives depends not only on the
ability of actors to respond, but also on whether incentives address prior learned and
organizationally conditioned preferences (McClelland, 1967; March, 1994). On the
other hand, alternative degrees of dis-aggregating economic activity condition the
incentives to invest in specialized learning. A central question then becomes how
increasing degrees of dis-aggregation change incentives on the one hand, and the
ability to maintain and develop capabilities on the other.
C apability
efficiency
Incentive
 alignm ent
D is-aggregation
Figure 1: Dis-aggregation and two sources of efficiency
10
Capabilities - patterned routines that direct organizational behaviour - are maintained
and developed through use and experimentation (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Hippel,
1988). Adaptation of capabilities requires tacit and explicit learning in the exploitation
and exploration of such capabilities (March, 1991; March & Levinthal, 1993).
However, while adaptation requires a balance between both, firms face difficulties to
maintain this balance because successful routines tend to be reinforcing while
incentives for selecting new initiatives are limited in variety. Corporate dis-
aggregation can contribute to resolve both problems.
For example, competence traps (Levinthal & March, 1993) result form
positive feed back between experience and competence. Firms engage in activities
more frequently in which they are competent, thus, exploiting past learning for further
refinement. The flip side, however, is that variety of experience and experimental
learning diminishes as time pass by, thus, tipping the balance between explorative and
exploitative learning in the favour of the latter (March, 1991). Moreover, the costs of
experimenting in areas outside current competence increases the more remote such
experimental learning is from the current competence base. For one thing, the less
knowledge one has to interpret experimental results the more misinterpretation may
rule. Additionally, the less experience one has in any given initiative the higher
subjective risk evaluation might be. For another thing, to the extent that a learner
becomes increasingly removed from remote bases of experience and knowledge, the
more vulnerable to changes in his environments he becomes (Levinthal & March,
1993; Tushman & Andersen, 1986). Partly, increasing degrees of relational
outsourcing contributes to cure the trap of over-exploitative learning. For example,
through exposing the firm to a greater variety of learning possibilities at a higher
number of organizational interfaces, and also, through risk sharing in inter-firm
learning arrangements during co-operative experimentation.
Organizations are often constrained in differentiating their incentives. This is
mainly because a shift to high-powered incentives (Williamson, 1985) could break
prior contractual commitment (Argyres & Liebeskind, 1998), may be regarded as
unfair (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993), or else, is simply incredible (Kreps, 1990;
Williamson, 1985). For example, implicit contracts between divisions and corporate
headquarters usually incorporate a sharing rule to carve up corporate profits (Argyres
& Liebeskind, 1999). Would top management decide that an internal venture requires
more high-powered incentives (e.g. stock-options) to spur intrapreneurship, this could
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violate prior implicit contracts concerning profit sharing rules among divisions. At
other times, providing high-powered incentives in firms faces limits due to pay
comparison within organizations (Pfeffer & Langton, 1993; Zenger, 1992).
Employees may reduce their effort when they perceive pay differences as inequitable
(Deutsch, 1985). With these difficulties present, it is not surprising that
undifferentiated incentives are the rule rather than the exceptions in firms (Holmstrom
& Milgrom, 1991; Williamson, 1985). Increasing degrees of relational outsourcing
circumvent impediments to differentiate incentives. For example, through exposing
managers to real (rather than simulated) market discipline, high-powered incentives
are facilitated if employees are made residual claimants through outsourcing. Also,
outsourcing makes top management’s commitment to high-powered incentives more
credible. Finally, comparison issues might be relaxed when boundedly rational agents
compare incentives more strongly within the boundaries of their firm rather than
across it.
To summarize, this section has argued that governance change affects two
general sources of efficiency: capabilities and incentives. Outsourcing can increase
capability efficiency through (1) focussed learning in the outsourcing firm, (2)
overcoming competence traps, and (3) by limiting the risk of experimentation in the
exploration of new competence. Outsourcing can increase incentive efficiency
through (1) re-drawing implicit contracts, (2) relaxing social comparison issues and,
(3) by making credible commitments to high-powered incentives. The next section
addresses the question: What are the limits to corporate dis-aggregation and how do
they affect the process of governance change?
3.2. Limits to outsourcing and dis-aggregation costs
In an evolutionary perspective on governance change, there are at least two general
limits to outsourcing that have been insufficiently addressed in theories of firm
boundaries: governance inseparability and complementarity of capabilities.3 Resulting
dis-aggregation costs are related to knowledge codification in the specification of
interfaces in supplier/buyer system, loss of absorptive capacity, and complications
associated with integrating capabilities in the suppliers system.
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- Codification of interfaces
- Loss of absorptive capacity
- Re-integration costs
- etc...
Limits to outsourcing
Governance inseparability Complementarity of capabilities
Dis-aggregation costs
- Breaking commitments
- Tacit & explicit
Figure 2: Limits to outsourcing and dis-aggregation costs
Governance inseparability:
Argyres & Liebeskind (1999, 2000) recently suggested that prior contractual
commitments made by a firm may limit its ability to differentiate or change its
governance arrangements in the future. Rather than focussing on the characteristics of
isolated transactions (Williamson, 1996), they argue that “…governance of any new
transaction in which a firm engages may become linked inseparably with the
governance of other transactions in which the firm is already engaged.” Examples of
related prior commitments include patents, that provide more value to its holder
(because they are combined with complementary physical and human assets) than in
its next best alternative, exclusive supplier or distributor arrangements long term
employment contracts. Prior legal and psychological commitments with employees
are an especially important factor influencing governance change. If a firm wishes to
reduce employment levels during outsourcing, it might have to bear severance
payments to laid off employees, suffer from declining reputation as a good employer,
and/or deal with reduced morale among remaining employees (Matusik & Hill, 1998;
Kreps, 1990).
In essence, the authors assert that there are exit barriers on a governance level
because a
 
firm’s past governance choices significantly influence the range and types
of governance mechanisms that it can adopt in future periods. But the authors also
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introduce a crucial methodological point that bears resemblance to evolutionary
reasoning (Argyres & Liebeskind, 2000: 238): “…focus on the transaction as the unit
of analysis can obscure interdependencies between transactions.” To focus
governance choice on individual transaction attributes may lead to inefficient choices
because this overlooks possible impact on related transactions. In sum then, firms
cannot exist without making commitments (Kreps, 1990), but prior commitment
presents limits to outsourcing. As a consequence, even when asset specific
investments are not required for the efficient conduct of an activity, outsourcing
options might be impeded by prior contractual commitments.
Complementarity of capabilities:
Complementarity of capabilities is the technical corollary of governance
inseparability. It is an essential insight in the evolutionary literature that capabilities
develop in a context-dependent and path-dependent matter (e.g. Nelson & Winter,
1982; Dosi & Marengo, 1994). Moreover, interactive learning steps taken in
capability development involve tacit dimensions and causal ambiguity (Polanyi, 1967;
Lippman & Rumel, 1982). Thus, capabilities are not easily separated from each other
nor do they remain valuable to full extent detached from their context – the nexus of
routines in which they have evolved and in which they are conducted. Recent work in
both organizational economics (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1990; 1995; Holmström
and Milgrom 1991), the firm strategy literature (Dierickx and Cool 1989; Porter 1996)
and the HRM literature (Becker and Gerhart 1996; Baron and Kreps 1999) has
embraced this evolutionary insight to stress that activity systems are most effective
when complementarities are manifest between their constituent elements. These
interaction effects are the result of interactive, co-specialized, and partly tacit learning
of members involved in capability maintenance and development.
Complementarity obtains between two activities (say IT support and airline
logistics) when investing in one of these raises the return from investing in the other
one and vice versa (Milgrom & Roberts, 1991). Such interaction effects between
activities, lead to efficiency in executing capabilities. But this very effect also induce
inertia (Rumelt, 1995) that impedes changes in complementary activity systems.
Thus, the flip-side of this coin is that complementary activity systems can constrain
outsourcing possibilities of particular activities. Because lost interaction effects and
knowledge-spillovers between activities diminish the effectiveness of the remaining
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activity system, firms that outsource particular activities (be they core or not) may
suffer something akin to ‘phantom limb pains’ well known from medical cases. At
times, capabilities cannot be separated nor contracted out without compromising
complementarity in existing activity systems. Capability efficiency may also be
compromised, at least for a while, when outsourced activities must be integrated in
supplier systems. In sum then, limits to outsourcing obtain when there are costs to
breaking prior commitment and separating partly tacit capabilities.
Next I consider dis-aggregation costs related to knowledge codification in the
specification of interfaces in supplier/buyer system, loss of absorptive capacity, and
integrating capabilities in the suppliers system.
Knowledge-codifcation costs:
To outsource an activity requires that interfaces between a supplier’s and the firm’s
activity system be made explicit to facilitate efficient contracting and coordination of
activities. Unfortunately, however, such interfaces between activities involve tacit
elements. For example, when Air Canada outsourced its IT-logistic system to IBM,
the systems operation break down for 5 days and remained interrupted for another 3
month, causing substantial losses despite substantial up-front planning. The costs of
codifying and making explicit interfaces between activity systems (e.g. logistics and
other airline operation), impose cost of dis-aggregation during governance change.
Cowen & Foray (1997:595) describe codification of knowledge as a production
process that includes “model building, language creation and the writing of
messages.” These sub-processes are performed in practice through brainstorming
sessions, discussions in teams, exchange of thoughts, and interface analysis. It is
important to note, however, that codification processes are often riddled by
imperfection, that they are time consuming, and therefore costly.  In the specification
of interfaces among activity systems, there are several degrees of codification.
Possibilities range from scarce specifications of requirements to rich description of
procedures and context information. One of the key decisions in the process of
codification is therefore not only the choice what knowledge to codify, but
additionally to which extent knowledge should be codified at which costs (Liebskind,
1997). Approvingly, Nelson & Winter (1982: 82) argue: “…it should be emphasized
that cost matter. Whether a particular bit of knowledge is in principle articulable or
necessarily tacit is not the relevant question in most behavioral situations. Rather, the
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question is whether the costs associated with the obstacles to articulation are
sufficiently high so that the knowledge in fact remains tacit.” To identify associated
costs it is helpful to describe knowledge codification as a production process through
which prior tacit knowledge is transformed into codified artefacts, such as interfaces
among activities:
 Tacit Knowledge Not Tacit Knowledge
Articulated KnowledgeNot Articulated Knowledge
Expressed KnowledgeNot Expressed Knowledge
(A)
(B)
(Explicit Knowledge)
(C)
Codified Knowledge
Figure 3: Knowledge codification as production process (Similar: Winter, 1987)
While Nonaka’s (1994) distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge is integral to
the more fine-grained distinctions made here (See also Winter, 1987), it is interesting
to ask why some knowledge is not expressed to others?  For knowledge to be codified
it must be previously expressed. Calling for a realistic model of ‘man’, Stein &
Ridderstråle (1996) rightfully assert that individuals may not only know more than
they can tell, they may also tell less than they know, and at times tell more than they
know. Moreover, individuals may not articulate what they could articulate, and may
not express to others what they articulate to themselves. This is particularly prevalent,
when people fear to loose their job through outsourcing.
There are several reasons why knowledge is not expressed to others and as a
consequence remains un-codified. For one thing, that might be impossible in principle
when knowledge is purely tacit. For example an artist might not be able to symbolise
how he creates his painting, a top sales manager might not be able to convey how he
wins client deals, or a manager might not be able to articulate how he survives the
daily thrill of political manoeuvring. More generally, in actual routine performances,
time constraints may prevent articulation ‘during the attempt’ and people involved
may lack understanding of causal relations between action and performance (cf.
Nelson & Winter, 1982:80). Additionally, symbolizing knowledge might be possible
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in principle, but the articulation of knowledge is difficult and time consuming. For
example, why should manager formulate particular knowledge about interfaces
between activities, at least to himself, when there are obvious personal costs to do so
while personal benefits are absent or hard to identify? When knowledge is articulated,
at least in the mind of one person (e.g. conscious reason, internal speech), there arises
the question whether it should be expressed to others and why this should be done?
People may hideaway knowledge strategically to create dependencies (Pfeffer, 1982).
They may hoard knowledge for later harvesting (Stein & Ridderstråle, 1996), or gain
advantages in contractual exchange (Akerlof, 1970). Moreover, they may seek to
avoid loss of face value by ‘biting tongues’ or ‘swallowing pride’ (Harre & DeCarlo,
1985), or circumvent political hazards or conflict in situations where people may
know more than is legitimate to express (Goldhaber, 1993).
When one decides to keep knowledge to oneself, knowledge remains entirely
personal, unexpressed and not displayed. When one decides to express knowledge to
others, there is still no guarantee that those who receive this expression understand
properly. This requires prior shared knowledge from which understanding and fast
learning can proceed (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). In sum, there are many reasons why
people can know more than they tell and others understand, including a general
impossibility to articulate, a cost/benefits analysis with negative results, a hoarding of
articulated knowledge for strategic reasons, an inability of receivers to understand due
to lacking shared codes (Arrow, 1974). To further complicate the picture, while there
are many reasons why people know more than they can tell, want to tell, or are able to
communicate, they may at times not only tell less than they could, they may also tell
more (cf. Stein & Ridderstråle, 1996). For example, when they opportunistically
distort and manipulate signals expressed to others (e.g. Williamson, 1996; 1999).
Usefully, two categories of costs in codification processes can be distinguished:
direct production costs and residual losses. While the former captures managerial time
spent to seek and describe knowledge, detach it from initial use or users, and to
embody it in some adequate form to make it accessible and useful for the specification
of interfaces among activities, the later concerns losses that occur because tacit
knowledge can only be imperfectly codified into explicit knowledge. Direct costs in
the process of knowledge-codification are influenced by several cost-drivers. First,
codification costs are the higher, the less the production process is codified ex ante.
Second, the thicker and detailed the descriptions of activity interfaces (e.g. contextual
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features are added to a codified process description), the more time will be used and
the higher the efforts of codification. Finally, the more activities are interconnected
with other activities, the less partial codification is self-contained and sufficiently
useful in isolation (Winter, 1987).
Residual losses occur because the richness and nuances of tacit knowledge are
partially lost in the process of codification. Since tacit knowledge can not be
completely converted into explicit knowledge, attempts to codification involve
simultaneously an element of reduction – that is, abstracting away nuances and details
required for knowledge-based performances. For example, MacKenzie & Spinardi
(1995) showed in the case of nuclear weapon production that, despite substantial
efforts of codification, tacit knowledge could not be codified to full extent. Likewise,
Polanyi (1967) has earlier argued that tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge are
complements rather than substitutes. While explicit and codified knowledge is
instrumental to develop tacit knowledge (e.g. a cook book aids cooking, but does not
contain the ability to cook of the one who wrote it), tacit knowledge can be at best
imperfectly described and encoded. It is thus, that any attempts to codify knowledge
in the organization are inherently limited. In sum, when outsourcing requires the
codification of interfaces between activities, codification costs contribute to explain
the costs of dis-aggregation. Additionally, not only codification costs, but also quality,
long term learning, and adaptability considerations are important during governance
change (e.g. Popo & Liebeskind, 1998).
Loss of absorptive capacity:
Section 3.1 has argued that outsourcing might contribute to overcome
competence traps through exposing the firm to a greater variety of learning
possibilities at a higher number of organizational interfaces. On the other hand,
outsourcing may also establish a greater need for accessing external knowledge in the
form of contingent work (Matusik & Hill, 1998) embedded in specialized supplies
(Demsetz, 1988) or, else through inter-firm learning (e.g. Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000;
Stalk, & Lyles, 1996). Simultaneously, however, reduced activity share and learning
variety (March, 1991) as a consequence of outsourcing may undermine a firm’s
absorptive capacity – the ability to access, integrate and use external knowledge
sources (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). The effects of decreased absorptive capacity
include higher search costs to find specialised production partners as well as
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impediments to access and utilise their knowledge (e.g. Aurora & Gambarella, 1994).
Thus, reaping specialisation gains through focused learning in a focal firm is limited
by reduced absorptive capacity that prevents tapping into and taking advantage of
external knowledge sources of suppliers. When outsourcing reduces absorptive
capacity, long-term adaptability might be compromised, which imposes a long-term
opportunity cost of experimental learning in exploring new competencies as a
consequence of governance change. In sum then, outsourcing can contribute to
overcome competence traps through exposing the firm to a greater variety of learning
possibilities at a higher number of organizational interfaces. But it is one thing to say
that learning opportunities are increased through outsourcing. It is quite another thing
to take advantage of such opportunities.
Integrating new activities at supplier side:
Outsourcing processes are complex processes that span across the outsourcer’s and
outsourcee’s activity systems. When it is possible to dissect capabilities on the
outsourcer’s side there is no guarantee that efficiency gains are realized because the
supplier need to re-integrate outsourced activities to achieve complimentarity. In
practice, human resource might be transferred from one company to another or
suppliers perform more related activities. Independently of how an integration of
outsourced activities is achieved on the supplier side, it is well known from the
literature on post-merger integration that such processes come with complications
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991, Jemison & Sitkin, 1986). Potential synergies (e.g.
economies of scale and scope in various parts of the entire value chain) between new
and prior performed activities might be available on the supplier’s side. But
integrating activities may also require substantial investments in, for example,
transition teams, re-arranging knowledge and material flows, establishing advice
networks, and encouraging cooperation (Hamel, 1991; Levinthal & March, 1993;
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Lyles & Stalk, 1996; Grant, 1996). Moreover, employees
that are transferred from one to another company might react negatively to the new
employer, see their career prospects compromised, or may reject a new working
culture (Sales & Mirvis, 1984). Not in all cases do such integrative problems occur,
but when they do, associated activities impose process costs of governance change,
which require consideration.
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To summarize, this section has argued that there are two important limits to
governance change: prior contractual commitment and partly tacit capabilities.
Outsourcing and governance change is constrained by these limits and associated dis-
aggregation costs including (1) codification costs in interface specification, (2) loss of
absorptive capacity, and (3) the costs of integrating activities in supplier systems.
Outsourcing processes might be impeded by such limits to outsourcing and associated
costs of dis-aggregation. As a consequence, a shift from internal to external
procurement of activities is constrained or slowed down. Furthermore, taking
advantage of sources of efficiency might be compromised. The next section addresses
the question: How do organisations respond to limits to outsourcing and dis-
aggregation costs?
3.3 Governance compromise
Outsourcing can increase capability efficiency through focussed learning in the
outsourcing firm, overcoming competence traps, and by limiting the risk of
experimentation in the exploration of new competence. Also, outsourcing can increase
incentive efficiency through re-drawing implicit contracts, relaxing social comparison
issues and, by making credible commitments to high-powered incentives. However,
given the limits to outsourcing there are possible organisational responses, which
compromise to various degrees two sources of efficiency in the experimental search to
improve incentive alignment and capabilities.
Capability
efficiency
Incentive
 alignment
t1
Governance
compromise
t2 t3
Figure 4: Governance compromises
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This section suggests that the most significant impact of the above mentioned
limits to outsourcing may be captured by trading off temporarily unavoidable
efficiency losses that occur due to misalignment of incentive and inefficient learning
investments in the maintenance and upgrading of particular capabilities. Governance
compromises may result (Barney & Lee, 2000). Because, efficiency losses incurred
due to limits of outsourcing may be overcome in the long run, an important short-term
remedy can be to accept lower incentive efficiency and focus on efficiency
improvement of learning investments. Alternatively, efficiency of learning
investments may be compromised in the favour of higher incentive efficiency. For
example, assume that in the long run an outsourcee might be better equipped to
maintain and upgrade capabilities compared to the original firm. But because there are
tacit complementarities between capabilities, employment contracts might be
transferred to an outsourcee while employees remain temporarily in the same building
with prior colleagues. In this case, employees might be rewarded according to new
incentive schemes without compromising capability development because proximity
to prior colleagues ensures that complementarily in capabilities remains undisrupted.
Nonetheless, reward changes might be constrained because social comparison among
former colleagues is still operative because of physical proximity.
Understanding the characteristics of inherent tradeoffs and/or substitution
possibilities between capability and incentive efficiency in the long run, depends
additionally on the environmental dynamics. Degrees of demand-, technological-, and
contractual uncertainty in conjunction with pre-existing capabilities may influence
possibilities and incentives for learning investments to maintain or upgrade activities.
For example, more dynamic environments (e.g. creative destruction) de-emphasise
efficiency losses related to knowledge-leakage due to weak property right; but instead
stress access to external knowledge and learning speed. Conversely, stable
environments (e.g. knowledge accumulation regimes) stress property rights more, and
protection against knowledge leakage becomes more important.
Furthermore, when knowledge-structures in markets change through differential
rates of learning of market participants, new knowledge gaps may emerge which (a)
suggest a re-allocation of property rights to resources among agents to channel
resource to productive use in the process of creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1950)
and (b) may lead to the use and exploitation of asymmetric knowledge and
information through profit seeking behaviour (Knight, 1921). Conversely, when
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knowledge-structures change through increasingly shared knowledge, and market
participants know increasingly similar things, verification possibilities increase and
agency conflicts may diminish. Additionally, when market participants learn about
their partners in repeated games (Parkhe, 1993), costly ownership arrangements may
be substituted by market contracting or relational contracting (Williamson, 1996).
More generally, modern transaction cost theory assume that underlying knowledge-
structures are essentially unchanged during the duration of the above mentioned
strategic choices. This, however, cannot be assumed as knowledge-structures change
through differential learning speed among agents in markets.
To sum up, governance compromises seek to consider trade-offs and
substitution possibilities between sources of efficiency; environmental dynamics
influence governance compromises, and governance compromises are temporary and
experimental. As time pass by, compromises in incentive and capability efficiency
might be improved as participants in the evolutionary process of governance change
discover and learn further possibilities for improvements of governance efficiency.
4. Discussion
What determines the boundaries of the firm is a central question in the economic
theory of the firm (Holmström & Tirole, 1989; Hart, 1995; Williamson, 1975, 1985).
It is also an increasingly relevant question for business practice. Current theories of
firm boundaries do not directly address process questions of corporate dis-aggregation
including outsourcing. Nonetheless, they deal with important variables indicating
when outsourcing might be considered as a governance option in the organization of
productive activities (see table 1 below).
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Focal Concern Main Variable Limits to outsourcing
Transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1996)
Main proposition:
Activities requiring specific
investments should be governed in
the firm to avoid hold up, which
may occur in the outsourcing case.
Possibilities to outsource:
Activities that do not require (or do
not require anymore) assets specific
investments (small bargaining
argument).
Asset specificity,
Frequency,
Uncertainty
Never outsource activities that
require specific investment
Stop outsourcing when production-
cost disadvantages (including
efficient learning investments) are
smaller than risk costs of hold up in
outsourcing arrangement.
Measurement costs (Barzel, 1997; Alchian & Demsetz)
Main proposition: Measurement
costs of input to the value creation
process of the focal firm influence
relative efficiency of firm and
market procurement.
Possibilities to outsource:
Contribution to the value creation of
the focal firm can be efficiently
rewarded (contribution linked to
pay) through external contractual
arrangements.
Measurement costs
Do not outsource, when
measurement difficulties can be
better (cheaper, more effectively)
be alleviated in firms (selective
invention, authority, task
restriction, surveillance
technology).
Property right approach (Grossman & Hart, 1986)
Main proposition: Allocation of
residual rights of assets to parties
whose investment incentives (in
human capital) are most important
to their productive use.
Possibilities to outsource:
Outsource assets to parties whose
learning investments are more
important for the productive asset
use.
Residual decision rights
Specific human capital investments
Never outsource assets, when the
learning investment of the focal
firm are most important to asset
usage
Importance of learning of
different parties might change
over time
Resource based view (Barney, 1991 & Peteraf, 1993))
Main proposition: Govern and
conduct activities inhouse that are
rare, valuable, non-imitable, and
non-substitutable
Possibilities to outsource:
Activities, which miss some or
several of these attributes (not core-
resources)
Resource properties
Core resources and activities that
do not have these attributes, but
cannot be sourced from
incomplete or imperfect markets
(market failure)
Competences  (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994)
Main proposition: Focus on core
competences
Possibilities to outsource:
Outsource the rest
Learning in organizations,
especially how to coordinate
diverse production skill and
integrate multible streams of
technology
Never outsource coordination
tasks, when learning about
coordination of skills and
technology is superiour to other
companies (e.g. dis-similar
activities)
Table 1: Firm boundaries and limits to outsourcing
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Taken together these theories suggest that outsourcing might be considered as a
governance option
1. if hold up risks are absent (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1996);
1. if outsourced input to the value creation process of the focal firm can be measured
(Barzel, 1997; Alchian & Demsetz, 1972).
2. if learning investments in asset-usage-specific skills are less efficient relative to
potential outsourcing partners (Grossman & Hart, 1986);
3. if technologies and skills might be more efficiently integrated elsewhere because
of superior coordination knowledge in other firms (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994);
4. if resources utilized lack one or several of the following characteristics:. resources
might not be simultaneously rare, valuable, non-imitable, and non-substitutable
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).
For example, transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1979; 1996) and the property
right literature (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart, 1995) speak to the question what
variables influence make or buy decisions by concentrating on required incentives to
make asset-specific investments in support of a given transaction (Klein, Crawford, &
Alchian, 1978). Placing the ownership of the assets in a given transaction into the
hands of a single party improves the incentives for making efficient transaction-
specific investments when contracts are incomplete and the cost associated with a
hold-up is significant (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990). Investment
incentives may be diluted when parties to a transaction are exposed to hold up risk in
contractual relations. Such risk may be attenuated, however, either by the acquisition
of residual rights to asset usage (Hart, 1995) or, more generally, by hierarchical
governance to make provision for flexible adaptation in incomplete contracts
(Williamson, 1991). While contractual theories of the firm are perhaps most
concerned with vertical integration (an increase in the scope of the firm), they also
indicate when outsourcing becomes an option. Although current theories of firm
boundaries indicates when outsourcing becomes a governance option, collectively
they fails to address the question why not all firms outsource if there are potential
efficiency gains and specific investments are not required? Answers to this question
are hard to device unless we gain a deeper understanding of outsourcing as a process.
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Conclusion
In the spirit of the evolutionary theory of the firm, this paper has addressed the
process gap in theories of firm-boundaries. Adopting an evolutionary perspective
suggests limiting factors in managing governance change, including governance
inseparability, and partly tacit complementarity of capabilities. A key departure from
earlier approaches to firm boundaries is an explanation of such process limits to
outsourcing and their impact on two sources of efficiency: incentives and capabilities.
When limits to outsourcing impose dis-aggregation costs, governance change for
particular activities involves compromises of capability- and/or incentive efficiency in
the experimental determination of organizational boundaries. Future research is
needed to link the processes of governance change to different forms of relational
contracting. Also, theories of selection in the context of organizational forms and
particular governance mechanisms (Grandori, 2001, forthcoming) deserve attention.
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